Abstract. Electronic Commerce involves more than simple online transactions, it also deals with several other elds such as market research, customers care, document exchange and customer modeling. Our paper deals with the customer modeling issue, rst introduced in the companion paper 4], where a model is presented of a system that can adapt its response to customers. We present here the necessary extension to the model so that it can be used on a distributed system for EC on the World Wide Web. The extensions presented are simple, easy to implement, not computationally expensive, and preserve the privacy of all the actors in an EC distributed system, while ensuring the adaptive behaviour.
Introduction
Electronic Commerce (EC) is getting much interest as research eld, due to the development and widespread usage of the Internet and the World Wide Web. The sky-rocketing increase in number of users connected to the network makes this eld central and important both from the scienti cal and the commercial point of view. Many enterprises are o ering services and goods through the network to an always wider audience and the challenge to the researchers is to develop and study distributed systems that are able to ful ll the promises of such \revolution".
EC involves more than simple online transactions, it encompasses diverse activities as conducting market research, identifying opportunities and partners, cultivating relationships with customers and suppliers, document exchange and customer modeling.
Our paper deals with the latter aspect of EC. We introduce here a distributed model for developing an EC adaptive system on the World Wide Web such that it can adapt its response to customers.
The model (presented for intranets in the companion paper 4]) is symmetric: we model both customers and goods and make both their pro les change as a consequence of a customer buying a certain product. The symmetry in our model greatly simpli es the approach and the queries, giving some insights on the formalization of the allowed queries that were, in way, unexpected. Furthermore, the model itself can provide an easy-to-evaluate measure for the con dence in adapting its response to any given customer and is able to provide useful feedback to the manager, then allowing, so to speak, \manual adjustment" that can help the behaviour of the system in the future.
We present here the necessary extension to the model so that it can be used on a distributed system for EC on the World Wide Web. In fact, critical issue in the eld of modeling customers and goods behaviour is to preserve the privacy of both the customer and the merchant. The former does not want that his behaviour can be used for purposes di erent from the \Helping serve you better" philosophy. The latter does not want that information on his transactions can be used by other merchants.
The issue of privacy is paramount in any EC distributed system that is to be deployed on the Internet. In fact, market research focuses on using information gathered about customers to re nes sales e orts.
The solution presented is able to ful ll the requirements about the privacy and, at the same time, provide both customers and merchants with an e cient system that helps the customers in nding a \personalized" approach in the electronic store and the merchants in selling on a targeted and analyzed audience.
EC Systems and World Wide Web
In the last few years, many systems have been proposed and implemented that are meant to o er capabilities to support Electronic Commerce. Here, we try a rst categorization of these systems by using a real-world analogy of a shop that has a Window, where potential customers can see goods, has a Clerk that is able to intelligently interact with customers, sell them goods and, nally, has a Cash where customers pay (either with cash, checks of cards).
Window Systems: in the early 90s, the WWW was recognized as a very e ective way to promote products of private enterprises. These systems were essentially not more than an \Electronic Window" that can be browsed by each customer so that, essentially, he can browse the catalog of the producer without moving from home. Advantages of these systems over the more traditional ways, are that information can be promptly updated on the server side and, therefore, immediately available to customers.
Clerk Systems: Later, it was recognized that customers (once they have made up their mind)
found awkward to place the order by ordinary mail, phone or fax. Then, systems allowed the customer to browse the catalog and, at the same time, proceed to shop with an \electronic cart". Customers could buy items, put them back on the virtual shelfs and so on. Finally, the order was placed by using WWW and con rmed/checked through ordinary systems for the payment. As an example, many systems require a preliminary step when the customer (by fax or mail) must send in information (as Credit Card numbers) and, in response, the customer can obtains a unique ID to the system. The order, once placed, sometimes is checked toward a previously given e-mail address and payments is, then, performed through ordinary ways. A well-known example is the protocol used until July 1997 by an electronic bookstore named Bookpool at http://www.bookpool.com. Electronic Cash Systems: Much attention is given, nowadays, to these kind of systems, where payment is done entirely by digital means, by using wallets, cryptographic protocols that can guarantee both the sender and the receiver of the others' identity and guarantee the privacy of the communication by avoiding eavesdropping.
Our interest is on Clerk Systems that are receiving far less attention than Electronic Cash Systems. Our goal is to design a mechanism that allows for interactive, intelligent, guided and adaptive shopping that is certainly more fruitful both from the customer's perspective ( nding interesting items in less time) and from the merchant's perspective (being able to respond to customer's unexpressed desires).
Although originally developed to facilitate information sharing (especially in academic environments), the World Wide Web has large potentials, partly already achieved, in the eld of Electronic Commerce.
It is our opinion that in order to fully exploit WWW potentiality (user interface, portability, extensibility and widespread access) in the EC eld, the merchant server must be a modi ed Web server, that must be aware of user's (the customer) behaviour so that it can take into account his interests and, as a consequence, provide the user with the right products, in few words it must be adaptive.
The problem, in a certain way, is similar to those experienced when WWW is used as an educational support, especially for distance learning. Several educational systems based on WWW have been developed in the recent past 8, 14] and some of them try to introduce adaptivity as a powerful tool to provide a better response, see 11] for a detailed bibliography.
In general, such adaptivity mechanism can be helpful to avoid the risk that users can \have trouble in nding the information they need" 16] because of the large amount of information available. An adaptive response from server can be able to avoid the \information overloading" by slowly increase the amount of information given to the user, information that is carefully chosen given the knowledge of the user.
The Privacy Issue in EC
Market research focuses on using information gathered about customers to re nes sales e orts. The process of gathering, storing, purchasing or selling information about customers often violates the privacy rights of the customers, who may never have given permission for information to be used 10]. Europe's privacy regulations restrict the use of personal information far more than those in the United States, where marketing interests tend to dominate. The EU Privacy Directive in particular forbids collection of certain data about EU citizens, including union membership, race, religion, health information, sexual preference and informations about the interactions that the customer has with a system of marketing.
This means that: 1. No personal data should be transmitted without adequate privacy protection; 2. Customer must be able to view and correct their data; 3. Companies must notify customers of the intended use for collected data; 4. Companies cannot release personal data to others without consent; 5. Companies cannot adjust owner organization respect to the customers interactions and cannot improve their sales e cannot personalize customers requests.
The model
In this section we describe the model in a simpli ed scenario where a single commercial server is available and several customers access the server. This scenario is for ease of description but is not totally unrealistic. The model in a distributed environment is described in the following sections.
We assume that customers are divided in categories, as well as items. When a new customer arrives, or a new item is available for selling, it is possible to assign it a pro le corresponding to a stereotype that is chosen at the beginning. Stereotypes can be, of course, di erent and chosen as a consequence to the customer/item belonging to a category.
Informally, the idea of the pro le of a customer is to de ne a category and a vector of values that indicate his current predisposition to buy goods from certain products categories. Symmetrically, an item of merchandise has a category and a vector of values that indicate its predisposition to be bought from a customer of each category. The symmetry here is an innovative aspect of the method: we can develop queries that go both ways and that, in our opinion, are a surprisingly formalization of common practise in the EC eld.
We propose, here, also, several queries that can be performed on such a model and that can be used either to adapt the response toward customers but also to adjust the behaviour of the system by providing a useful feedback to the manager. For example, critical to the convergence of the system toward good responses is choosing right stereotypes and categories. Feedback can indicate that some stereotypes are too crude or that some categories have to be split in half or two categories joined.
We describe the requirements that are to be obtained by our model. This requirements are expressed in terms of easy and e cient management from the merchant side. The model:
{ must model customer's behaviour: if a customer interacts with the system, the status of the system after the interaction should depend on the interaction; { must be symmetric. Queries available for customer modeling should be also usable for merchandise modeling,to help the store manager; { must be able to measure the surprise of a particular customer buying a certain item of merchandise in order to provide feedback to the store manager; i.e., this could trigger an alarm for the manager of the electronic store, maybe the prize is too low, or maybe it is time to buy more items of the same kind (since they are particularly appreciated by people of an unexpected category) or maybe the customers' stereotypes are surpassed by the society and it may suggest that some stereotypes are too crude or plainly wrong; { must be able to provide a measure of the con dence of the mechanism in the forecast of the customer's behaviour; { must be able to characterize groups of homogeneous customers or items. That is, we would like to get a sample of customers whose behaviour is similar enough, maybe in order to propose them a \special o er". Or, on the other side, we would like to group close items (i.e. for example, directed to the same audience) in such a way to lower prizes for them. Or, maybe even more important, start from a set of homogeneous customers, then observe them and propose to one of them what the other has recently bought.
At the same time, there are characteristics that we would not like in our model, such as follows:
{ We do not want to keep history information: each customer can have some eld where special o ers are selected for them ad o ered as soon as they get connected.
{ We do not want computationally costly operations to be performed on the model: our system can have as many customers as millions and (for example) averaging over all the customer is simply unacceptable.
Queries in our model
In the rest of the paper, we call Customer any buyer that is connected to a commercial site (called Merchant).
The queries that we would like to be answered by our model are divided in two class: we show now queries in the interaction Customer/Merchant. { CUSTOMER: What is interesting to me?
List of the \top ten" products for a given customer (with a measure of con dence in the forecast).
{ MERCHANT: Who can be interested in this?
List of the \top ten" customers for a given item of merchandise (with a measure of con dence in the forecast).
{ CUSTOMER: Which merchandise group does this item belong to?
What are the goods that show a certain degree of a nity with this particular good I just bought (with a degree of con dence in the forecast).
{ MERCHANT: Which customers group does this customer belong to?
What are the customers that show a certain degree of a nity with the customer that just bought this good (with a degree of con dence in the forecast). Now we describe the queries that are related to system management and marketing policies. They are meant to provide e ective and e cient feedback to the management. { MERCHANT: Which con dence do I have in pro le of this customer/good?
The merchant should provide a measure of behaviour of the system on customers/goods and of its con dence.
{ MERCHANT: Should I change the stereotypes? if all (or a large percentage of) the customers of the same category move together toward a limit con guration, maybe this should be the stereotype. The same for items of merchandise.
{ MERCHANT: Should I change the categories?
If all the customers of a given category split in exactly two subcategories (with relative limit con gurations) maybe I should split the categories as well. The same for items of merchandise. Moreover, it is easy to set an alarm that when the surprise of a transaction (the term is de ned shortly) is above a threshold is able to asynchronously call the manager to inform him that there is something strange.
The theoretical model
As we said at the beginning of section 2, the pro le of a customer consists of his category and a vector indicating the degree of interest (probability values) that the customer has with respect to each kind of merchandise. The same can be symmetrically said for goods' pro les. We now de ne formally the pro les and the model. This function measures the information that is given to the system when u buys m and goes from 0 (absolutely expected) to 1 (maximum surprise).
The function distance is the usual euclidean distance between points in f0; 1g k for customers and in f0; 1g d for items of merchandise.
The operations
Buying a product and updating pro les.
What happens to our model when customer U = (c; hu 1 ; : : :; u k i) wants to buy item M = (s; hm 1 ; : : :; m d i)? Let P = maxfS(U; M); u s g and Q = maxfS(U; M); m c g: 1 We want to emphasize by the term \related to" the bidirectionality of the system. We do not say that U buys M. Notice also that, the preference of a certain customer U for items of kind i, given by u i , can be increased due to the surprise of U buying an item of kind i that is not usually sold to people of the same category of U. The value u i can be also decreased due to surprises in other elds that make necessary make the con guration legal (i.e. summing up to 1).
\Top 10" queries.
Here we describe the \Top 10" query for a customer, the analog query for items of merchandise is totally symmetric.
Assume we want to present T items of interest for customer U = (c; hu 1 ; : : :; u k i). Such a list is built with the following proportions: there are as many as u i T items 2 for each kinds of goods i.
What are the goods in kind i selected for \top T" products for customer U? We select the items that are most wanted by customers in category c, that is we pick the goods that have maximum m c .
We emphasize here the advantages of the symmetric model: queries are easily obtained by reverting things in the model.
A nity queries.
Because of space limitation, we sketch here how a nity queries can be performed in our system. Recall that the second component of customer pro le is a vector with k elements. The distance function used is the usual euclidean distance in the sphere S with radius 1 and center t the origin in the space f0; 1g k . Now, an a nity query can be easily seen as a query of the kind:
given a point U in sphere S, nd all the points within distance`from U. The same is done for items of merchandise in f0; 1g d .
Con dence of the system
In this subsection, we sketch how our model can be used to give a measure of degree of con dence in the operations previously described. More details can be found in 4].
The con dence operations can be used to provide useful feedback to the manager and consists in evaluating the con dence that can be assumed for customers' pro les. The con dence for goods' pro les can be easily obtained by clerical changes, since the symmetry of our model. In the sequel, we give a very brief de nition and interpretation of the entropy as de ned by C. Shannon 19] . The interested reader may consult 2]. Entropy function is meant to measure the average uncertainty of a random variable X. H(X) does not depend on the values the random variable assumes, but only on probabilities associates with those values. In our model, U represents the probability distribution of the customer buying products of a certain category. The same interpretation can be given of the item of merchandise M.
The entropy of a random variable with`values ranges from 0 to log`. The smaller the values of H(X) are, the more certain is the outcome of the random variable X. In our model, if entropy of a customer U approaches to log k then it means that customer U is, more or less, buying items from all the kinds.
It is possible to consider the relationship between the interactions number of a customer and her entropy and have, therefore, a partition of customers in subsets of \well-behaving" and (hopefully) correctly modeled since their interactions are considered su cient by the system and subsets of customers that (for di erent reasons) are not as well modeled by the system.
How do we use the con dence in the queries previously de ned? Every time a customer U is given back as a result of the query, the system sends the con dence along with the results. The con dence can be used as a numerical measure to guide into the interpretation of the results. For example, consider a low con dence for a customer given back from a \Top 10 customers" query. Recall that this query is needed, for example, when a new item is arriving into the system and the manager wants to nd the best potential customers 4 . Now, a low con dence given to a customer U means for the manager, that, for example, customer U had only few interactions with the system and the fact that he is in the \Top 10 customer" for the given item may depend on his stereotype (the one assigned by the system at the entrance) and not by his behaviour that is not well known by the system.
The model in an untrustworthy environment
The model we just described is strongly based on the assumptions (true on intranets) that customers buy from a unique, single commercial server which is often unrealistic in the real world. These assumptions are further limiting the possibility that customers exports their pro les toward several distinct commercial servers, often competing with each other.
In this section, we rst brie y review the o -the-shelf protocols used to ensure privacy on the Internet nowadays (based on symmetric and asymmetric keys) and then present the architecture design to overcome these problems that arise from an untrustworthy environment.
Security and authentication
In our architecture, we use some encryption algorithms in a communication scheme composed of symmetric (DES) and asymmetric key (RSA) algorithms, that ensure the privacy of participants (overcoming an eventual malicious listener on the network) and the authentication.
Symmetric key algorithms Symmetric key algorithms are used for the bulk encryption of data or data streams. These algorithms are designed to be very fast and (usually) have a large number of possible keys. The best symmetric key algorithms o er near-perfect secrecy: once data is encrypted with a given key, there is \no way" to decrypt the data without possessing the same key. We use DES (Data Encryption Standard) that is a block cipher that uses a 56-bit key and has several di erent operating modes depending on the purpose for which it is employed.
Asymmetric key algorithms. Public-Key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography, uses two keys: one key to encrypt the message and the other key to decrypt the message. The two keys are mathematically related such that data encrypted with either key can only be decrypted using the other. Each user has two keys: a public key and a private key. The user distributes the public key. Because of the relationship between the two keys, the user and anyone receiving the public key can be assured that data encrypted with the public key and sent to the user can only be decrypted by the user using the private key. This assurance is only maintained if the user ensures that the private key is not disclosed to another. Therefore, the key pair should be generated by the user. The best known public-key cryptography algorithm is RSA (named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir and Adleman).
Con dentiality is ensured by the use of message encryption. When two users want to exchange messages securely, each transmits one component of their key pair, designated the public key, to the other and keeps secret the other component, designated the private key. Because messages encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted using the private key, these messages can be transmitted over an insecure network without fear that an eavesdropper can use the key to read encrypted transmissions.
Integrity and authentication are ensured by the use of digital signatures. Because of the mathematical relationship between the public and private keys, data encrypted with either key can only be decrypted with the other. This allows the sender of a message to encrypt it using the sender's private key. Any recipient can determine that the message came from the sender by decrypting the message using the sender's public key.
Integrity is ensured by use of message digest. A message digest is a value generated for a message (or document) that is unique to that message. A message digest is generated by passing the message through a one-way cryptographic function, i.e., one that cannot be reversed. When the digest of a message is encrypted using the sender's private key and is appended to the original message, the result is known as the digital signature of the message. The recipient of the digital signature can be sure that the message really came from the sender by decrypting the message using the sender's public key. And, because changing even one character in the message changes the message digest in an unpredictable way, the recipient can be sure that the message was not changed after the message digest was generated.
The architecture
The scenario we envisage is the following: there are several commercial servers, and several customer communities that want to access and, possibly, buy goods from the commercial servers using synthetic information about their behaviour stored in pro les.
The issue here is privacy: in such a distributed environment, the system should respect privacy of everybody. By ensuring the privacy of both customers and merchants we must guarantee the following two requirements:
1. We must ensure that analytical information about sold goods to customers from a certain merchant is kept hidden from other merchants.
2. We must ensure customers privacy in a twofold way: on one hand, analytical information about transactions with merchant X is known only to X; on the other hand customer pro les should be kept without any reference to customer's identity. The architecture of our model in an untrustworthy environment is based on three components that communicate under a strong authentication scheme (brie y described below):
1. A Pro ling Authority (PA), that holds the customers' pro les, distributes a customer pro le to the merchant servers and receives from the merchant the transactions list (containing only goods' pro les) and updates customer's pro le. 2. A Merchant, that is autorized to ask customers pro les to the PA so it can use them to improve its response toward customers satisfactions. Of course, it still keeps its local historical information on goods sold to each customer as well as the pro le of its items of merchandise. When the customer buys some goods, there is a protocol (described below) to update customer and goods' pro les. 3. A customer, that has to be enrolled at the PA, can allow Merchants to use its pro le (once per transactions) to adapt responses. At each interaction in the work session with a Merchant the customer enables the merchant to use the pro le using a protocol described below. Notice that customers pro les are synthetic information about life-long transactions with all the merchants. Therefore, we do not break customers' privacy if a pro le is given to a single merchant, since the merchant can only try to match it against its own local information about its transactions with that customer. On the other hand, information about customers' identity is hold on merchants (because of payment information) and is kept hidden from the PA by using an anonymous customer ID. Finally, customers' pro les loose meaning as time passes by, and therefore, it would be useless for the merchant to try to collect pro les.
One of the other advantages of our architecture design is that it makes meaningless for the merchant to hold local customers statistics because the pro le is built upon all the transactions and is much more signi cant.
Crucial to the privacy is the scheme used to (a) distribute customers' pro les to merchants and (b) authenticate the goods' pro les sent from merchant to PA . We only sketch here the schemes because of space limitations.
As we said before, the architecture of our model is based on three components that must communicate in a secure way. Each participant uses a scheme of asymmetric cryptography to send message to each other. PA uses DES (symmetric key algorithm) to encrypt and decrypt
